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Abstract 
Deviant globalization is a "powerful engine of wealth creation ...[P]articipating in deviant 
globalization is often an individual’s fastest ticket out of poverty and a way for an entire 
community to experience economic development.”  Although some aspects of deviant 
globalization undeniably include illegal conduct, such  “illegality  is not necessarily criminal or 
even unsavory in nature. “Deviant globalization” in the intellectual property arena serves as a 
powerful force for the creation of revised standards of protection.  It serves both a predictive 
and a normative function. It serves a predictive function because it incorporates the 
experimental standards we are already witnessing in domestic and international efforts to re-
invent intellectual property standards for the 21st Century. It serves a normative function 
because it creates a new normative standard that incorporates social and economic norms from 
the informal market into formal normative values against which decisions regarding intellectual 
property standards can be evaluated and revised.  With its emphasis on trade and innovation 
across socio-economic levels, and its focus on unmet consumer demands, deviant globalization 
based standards would bring new understandings of the relationship between compensation, 
access, and distributional innovation in present intellectual property debates. More effective 
support for distributional innovation under deviant globalization does not require that the 
needs of intellectual property owners be ignored.  However, it does require that their interests 
be re-balanced with those of sellers and consumers.  By focusing on compensation streams, 
deviant globalization puts the economic viability of piracy into play, not its moral necessity.    
Regulation is not the enemy of deviant globalization. Irrational regulation is.   Some 
experiments in crafting effective deviant globalization models will undoubtedly fail. Yet even 
such failures will be useful in recalibrating present international norms so that intellectual 
property protection can continue to provide the innovative foundation for a vibrant, socially 
just, global marketplace for the 21st Century.  
 
  




We are leaving an era of unprecedented multilateral integration. Fueled by the twin engines of 
globalization and technological development, the latter decades of the 20th Century, and the 
first decade of the 21st Century, have cabined a period of unparalleled global integration,2 
leading to an exponential growth in multilateral standard-making. Plurilateral free trade 
agreements that reduced trade barriers and opened new markets for economic growth 
flourished,3 while regional and multilateral treaties defined the boundaries of intellectual 
property rights in the digital universe.4 No area seemed unaffected by the leveling affects of the 
integratory process unleashed by globalization and the communicative capabilities of the digital 
environment.5 
At the same time, the challenges posed by digital distribution on the internet, including the 
social media networks that flourish on it, the rise of digital piracy, and increasing awareness of 
the inadequacy of present protection modalities to promote innovation in a developmentally 
diverse global economy,6 created demands for recalibrations to the present global intellectual 
property regime that have only grown more urgent as we enter the second decade of the 21st 
Century. These demands are made in the context of an international legal and diplomatic 
environment that has itself changed in response to the economic and technological 
developments of the new Century. Such changes do not prevent the development of new 
strategies for enforcing intellectual property rights or alterations to present models to provide 
adequate protection for new types of innovation or breathing space for the development and 
regulation of social networks. But they make the realization of the necessary changes to 
accomplish these goals more difficult to achieve on a multilateral basis.  
 
2 See Kenneth Pomeranz & Steven Topik, The World that Trade Created: Society, Culture and the World 
Economy. 1400 to the Present (2nd ed. M.E. Sharpe 2006); Doris Estelle Long, ‘Globalization: A Future Trend or a 
Satisfying Mirage’ (2001) 49 J.Copyright Society 313.  
3 Although the major initiators of such free trade agreements were the European Union, and the United States, 
other countries including China and Australia also negotiated plurilateral trade agreements with other countries.  
4 See European Union Directive on Copyright in the Information Society, Directive 2001/29/EC; WIPO 
Copyright Treaty; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.  
5 The author has described this leveling affect previously in Long (2001) at 325-326. 
6 Among the types of new protection modalities are those to protect indigenous innovation, including traditional 
knowledge, reconfigured mechanisms to allow freer access to intellectual property protected goods and services, 
particularly in connection with copyrighted works, pharmaceuticals and green technologies, and greater flexibilities 
to encourage technology transfers to meet consumer needs and encourage sustainable economic development.  
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Out of the experimentation that is the necessary result of the present multilateral phase I refer 
to as “dís·integration”7 will arise new normative modalities for protection, access and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights reflecting the norms of “deviant globalization.” 
Based on the teachings of the so-called “informal market,” and its fundamental principles, 
“deviant globalization” provides the opportunity to bring the social norms of the unregulated 
marketplace more firmly into international harmonization standards. Ultimately, the inclusion 
of this new normative foundation will lead to domestic and international regimes that provide a 
more balanced relationship between intellectual property protection, social justice and 
sustainable development. But to reach these new “standards,” we will first have to pass through 
an era of unprecedented domestic and regional experimentation where models may vary. But 
those that survive will reshape intellectual property rights for the 21st Century.  
1.1  From Integratory Processes to Dís·integratory Experimentation 
The official closing of the negotiations for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
in 2011 signaled the end of an era of unparalleled multilateral harmonization. The forces of 
integration, measured generally from the beginning of the Uruguay Rounds in 1986 that 
established the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to 
the final negotiating rounds of ACTA in 2011, combined trade, intellectual property and 
multinational governance into powerful tools for harmonization.8 Definitional boundaries for 
patents,9 trademarks,10 geographic indications11 and industrial designs12 were delineated under 
TRIPS while enforcement procedures were strengthened;13 substantive treaties regarding the 
protection of copyright and related rights on the internet were established;14 and multilateral 
 
7 I use the accented term “dís·integration” to place the emphasis on the “dis” prefix to the critical “integration” 
term. Unlike the more common term “dis·ín·tegration, the previous multilateral activities of the integratory 
periods have not disappeared (or disintegrated), but they have become less prevalent. Thus, even in stages of 
dís·integration, integration is still possible, although perhaps more difficult to achieve. 
8 See Long (2001) at 324 - 325; Peter Yu, ‘ACTA and its Complex Politics’ (2011) 3 WIPO Journal 1, 10 
(juxtaposing ACTA’s non-multilateral approach with prior bilateral, plurilateral and regional trade and investment 
agreements and warning “if ACTA represents the future of the international norm-setting process…the world will 
likely go through a long period of non-multilateralism.”); Doris Estelle Long, ‘The Dís·integratory Impact of ACTA 
on Intellectual Property Governance Structures’ (2012)(working draft on file with author)(describing the alternate 
processes of integration and dís·integration in the history of international intellectual property harmonization).  
9 TRIPS, Arts. 27, 28 (definition of patentable invention and description of minimum rights, respectively). 
10 TRIPS, Arts. 15, 16 (definition of trademark and description of minimum rights, respectively). 
11 TRIPS, Arts. 22, 23 (definition of geographic indications and particularized treatment for wines and spirits, 
respectively). 
12 TRIPS, Art. 25 (definition of industrial designs). 
13 TRIPS, Arts. 41 – 61 (imposing treaty obligations to provide “effective enforcement” through civil, border and 
criminal measures with potential trade sanctions for failure to meet such obligations).  
14 WIPO Copyright Treaty (providing the exclusive right to authors to make a work “available” on the internet); 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (providing similar rights to performers and phonogram producers). 
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treaties streamlining application obligations and procedures for patents and trademarks were 
created.15  
On a regional level, the integratory forces of multilateralism were most obvious in the 
increasing size of the European Union (EU), and the number of directives and regulations 
aimed at intellectual property standards it adopted.16 Even the treatment of domain names 
containing unauthorized third party trademarks was the subject of multilateral activity, albeit in 
the form of an agreed-upon private contractual remedy -- the Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Policy adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).17  
History demonstrates that such integratory multilateralism, however, is not monolithic. During 
the immediately prior period of integration, there were also instances of regionalism and 
dís·integration.18 Furthermore, integration itself is cyclical. There have been other periods of 
intense international cooperation followed by a retreat to respective “corners” until the next 
round of integratory multilateral activity arises again.19 The current dís·integratory phase of 
multilateralism, however, has been propelled by forces that have never before been so prevalent 
in domestic and international standard-making processes.20 In addition to the geographic 
 
15 See, e.g., the Patent Law Treaty (establishing multilateral standards for patent application obligations), and the 
Trademark Law Treaty and the Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks (the same for trademarks). 
16 These Directives and Regulations ultimately covered almost every aspect of the intellectual property sphere. 
From biotechnology-based patents to copyright in the Digital Age, from community trademarks to enforcement. 
For a complete list of present intellectual-property centered Directives and Regulations of the European Union, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/acquis/index_en.htm).  
17 See generally www.icann.org/udrp. Under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Process (UDRP), registrants agree to 
obligate individual domain name registrants for certain Generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs) to submit 
cybersquatting disputes to electronic arbitration with specified institutions including the WIPO Arbitration 
Center.  
18 Examples of such dís·integratory forces include the development of regional instruments for intellectual property 
protection including European Union Directives and Andean Community Decisions. See Long (2001) at 329 – 
334; Dr. Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘Proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements: Complementing or Supplanting 
Multilateralism?’ (2011) 11 Chicago J. International L. 598 ( analyzing the impact of the proliferation of regional 
trade agreements on the multilateralism of the World Trade Organization); Susan Sell, ‘Intellectual Property and 
Public Policy in Historical Perspective: Contestation and Settlement,’ (2004) 38 Loy. LA L. Rev. 267 (discussing 
the repeated processes of contest and settlement in the development of international standards in intellectual 
property ) But cf. Ruth Okediji, ‘Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property 
Protection,’ (2003-2004) 1 U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. 125 (contending that bilateral and plurilateral agreements are 
the dominant forms for multinational norm making).  
19 Among the most notable instances in the 20th Century of this cycle of dís·integration may be the developments 
leading up to the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement, see Monique Cordray, ‘GATT v. WIPO’ (1994) 76 J. Pat. 
& Trademark Off. Soc’y 121, and the Universal Copyright Convention, see Silke von Lewinski, International 
Copyright Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2008) 4.33 – 4.48; Hamish R. Sandison, ‘The Berne Convention 
and the Universal Copyright Convention: The American Experience’ (1986-1987) 11 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 89.  
20 See Doris Estelle Long, ‘Exposing the Processes of Empire in the International Protection of Intellectual 
Property’ in IP In Context: Law and Society Perspectives on Intellectual Property (Cambridge U. Press 2012)(describing 
the historical processes that created the foundational international intellectual property conventions of the 19th 
Century)(forthcoming).  
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regionalism and glocalization that economic globalization has engendered,21 new dís·integratory 
forces, including the waning of the Westphalian model for sovereign power,22 the emerging 
power of civil society,23 and the role of digital communications in empowering previously 
unempowered actors at the domestic and international level,24 have altered the processes for 
international standard setting in ways that are still evolving.25 What is most unique about this 
upcoming phase of dís·integration is that it has not been triggered solely by the withdrawal of 
developed countries from existing institutional structures. Nor has it been triggered by 
countries seeking higher protectionist standards. To the contrary, with the greater 
communicative abilities of the internet and other digital mobilizing media, and the larger array 
of civil society organizations seeking reduced intellectual property protection to promote greater 
access to information and sustainable development, the present dís·integration cycle has been 
equally driven by the developing world’s search for innovation strategies for emerging 
 
21 See Benjamin Barber, Jihad v. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World (Ballatine 
1996)(describing the conflicting trends of globalization and regional alienation); Thomas Freidman, Lexus and the 
Olive Tree (Harper Collins 1999)(same). These seeds of dís·integration, however, have been present almost since 
the earliest stages of the present era of globalization. See Long (2001) at 335 – 340. 
22 See Joseph A. Camilleri & Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmented World 
(Edward Elgar 1992)(analyzing the evolving interactions between nation states, regional ethnicities and 
transnational actors in shaping the world political system); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in 
World Politics (Public Affairs 2004)(exploring the impact of “soft power” in shaping world politics, including the 
soft power exercised by such non-governmental actors as multinational corporations); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A 
New World Order (Princeton University Press 2005)(exploring the impact of “government networks” and 
supranational organizations in the present global political order); Long (2001) at 328 (“Whether the erosion of 
sovereign power is the result of a transfer to sub-state entities on the basis of regional, ethnic or other divisions, or 
the result of a reconstitution of state entities into new “transgovernmental” orders, nation states no longer have 
the same power they exercised in the pre-globalized world.”). But see Daniel Drezner, All Politics is Global: Explaining 
International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton University Press 2007)(contending that nation states still dominate 
international regulatory efforts).  
23 See Rodney Hall & Thomas Biersteker (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge 
University Press 2003)(examining the erosion of power of nation states and the emergence of diverse multinational 
actors, including NGOs); Anna Spain, ‘Who’s Going to Copenhagen?: The Rise of Civil Society in International 
Treaty-Making’ (2009) 14 ASIL Insights 25 (detailing the rise of civil society participation in international treaty 
making). One clear indication of the power of such civil societies is the number of NGOs accredited as observers at 
WIPO proceedings. For the 1996 Diplomatic Conference that led to the adoption of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
no official accreditation of NGOs was made, although some delegations included “Advisors” that were members of 
NGOs. For the Beijing Audio Visual Treaty in June 2012, nine NGOs were accredited as observers.  
24 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization (Routledge 
2004)(describing how the internet has spread power to smaller, less structurally organized actors internationally 
than previously); Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (Yale 
University Press 2006)(describing the weakening of path dependency and future empowerment of various actors 
through the development of the internet).  
25 Thanks to Peter Yu for suggesting a tri-partite division for such dís·integratory forces in the form of regionalism, 
rejection of Westphalian models and institutional governance. In addition to these forces, I believe that another 
force for dís·integration has come into significant prominence–digital communications with its ability both to 
enhance and to narrow international avenues of communications. See Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton 
University Press 2002)(warning that cyberspace threatens the exchange of information by allowing like-minded 
individuals to speak only to one another).  
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economies and models of protection that promote sustainable development and innovation.26 
“Dís·integration” does not mean that multilateral cooperation will cease. To the contrary, the 
recent creation of the Beijing Audio-Visual Performances Treaty in June 2012 (BAVT) 
demonstrates that older institutions may still serve as a focus for multinational standard-making 
processes. But a closer study of the BAVT demonstrates a lack of the potential leveling effect on 
international standards of earlier multilateral efforts, such as TRIPS and the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty (WCT).27  
In this period of increasing dís·integration, a multiplicity of forums have arisen to take the 
place of earlier traditional institutions.28 These multiple forums provide the necessary 
“laboratories” for experimentation that will form the critical next step in multilateral 
harmonization processes. This experimentation, however, may be hampered by the initial 
absence of institutional structures to accommodate, or even encourage, cross-forum 
communication. This absence is only heightened by the dís·integratory impact of the internet 
where like-minded entities talk only to each other and rhetorical excesses multiply.29 This 
limited communication - combined with a lack of transparency that remains the shuddering 
norm for certain multinational standard setting efforts – including most recently ACTA and 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) -- may well prolong the present period of dís·integration. 
But if such communication difficulties are the downside of dís·integration, the concomitant 
rise in experimentation is the upside. Because out of the experimentation that is the necessary 
 
26 See Lawrence Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking’ (2004) 29 Yale J. International L.1 (describing the movement to alternative forums to secure 
alternative models of protection under human rights, biodiversity and public health regimes); Joyeeta Gupta, 
‘Global Sustainable Development Governance: Institutional Challenges from a Theoretical Perspective,’ (2002) in 
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 361 – 388 (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers)(identifying multiple pathways as the most effective method for achieving global sustainable 
development).  
27 Compare Beijing Audio Visual Performances Treaty, Art. 11(3) (right to equitable remuneration for broadcasting 
and communication to the public subject to domestic law, including determination to reject such rights in toto) & 
Art. 18 (reservation allowed to Article 11(3) broadcast and public communication obligations) with WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Art. 15(3) (domestic rejection limited to equitable remuneration for 
broadcast and communication rights) & Article 21 (reservation limited to equitable remuneration rights under 
Article 15(3)). For a brief examination of the critical role that harmonized standards play in leveling global IP 
protection, see Doris Estelle Long, ‘“Democratizing” Globalization: Practicing The Policies Of Cultural Inclusion,’ 
(2002) 10 Cardozo J. of Int’l & Comp. L 217. 
28 These include both regional associations such as ASEAN who are increasingly addressing intellectual property 
issues, civil society organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and new forums established to deal 
with development and intellectual property including the World Summit on the Information Society.  
29 See Sunstein (2002)(describing the threat to free speech as a result of the ability to reduce discussions on the 
internet to those among like minded individuals); Pamela Samuelson, ‘The Copyright Principles Project: 
Directions for Reform’ (2010) 25 Berkeley Technology L.J. 1175, 1179 (“Too much discourse about copyright law 
in the past fifteen years has been burdened by rhetorical excesses and an unwillingness to engage in rational 
discourse with those having different perspectives.”). But cf Peter Yu, ‘TRIPS and its Achilles’ Heel’ (2011) 18 J. of 
Intellectual Property L. 479, 530. ( “[I]f less developed countries want to drive the discussions on international 
intellectual property enforcement norms, they need to frame the public debate better.” (footnote omitted).).  
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result of dís·integration will arise the next critical stage in the development of rational 
intellectual property protection standards for the 21st Century—“Deviant Globalization.”  
2 “Deviance” as the New Intellectual Property Norm 
In Deviant Globalization: Black Market Economy in the 21st Century,30 Nils Gilman, Jesse 
Goldhammer and Steven Weber describe “deviant globalization” as the underground corollary 
or “underside”31 of globalization. They use the term to refer to markets which “satisfy demand 
for goods and services that are otherwise illegal or unavailable in the formal, licit economy.”32 
Included among the types of goods and services examined by Gilman et al are the global sex 
trade, the market for human organs, hazardous waste, arms trafficking, terrorist funding, and 
the “global hacker service economy.”33 Interestingly, Gilman et al do not directly examine one 
of the most infamous examples of “deviant globalization” under their definition – the trade in 
counterfeit and pirated goods and services, including the rise of rogue websites on the internet 
that specialize in such goods and services.34 Despite this limitation, Gilman et al’s description of 
the fundamental benefits of deviant globalization provide a useful normative background for 
future intellectual property standards. The “dynamic process of creative destruction”35 that 
deviant globalization harnesses; its ability to “chang[e] the landscape and distribution of power 
in the world economy” by altering concepts of “what is do-able in economic life”36 and to 
materially improve the economic well-being “of hundreds of millions of people;”37 make it a 
useful paradigm for incorporating social justice considerations more clearly into intellectual 
property norms. In fact, deviant globalization is “a powerful engine of wealth creation 
 
30 Nils Gilman, Jesse Goldhammer & Steven Weber, Deviant Globalization: Black Market Economy in the 21st Century 
(Continuum International Publishing Group 2011)  
31 Gilman (2011) at 1. 
32 Gilman (2011) at 3. They go on to define “deviant globalization” as “the ultimate arbitrage activity, growing at 
the intersection of ethical difference and regulatory inefficiency. Wherever there is a fundamental disagreement 
about what is right as well as a connection to the global market, deviant entrepreneurs are there to meet the 
unfulfilled demands.” Gilman (2011) at 3. See also Moisés Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are 
Hijacking the Global Economy (Doubleday 2005) at 226 (describing “illicit trade networks” whose “clear goal” is 
“profit by breaking laws.”).  
33 See Scott Berinato, ‘Inside the Global Hacker Service Economy’ (2011) in Gilman (2011) at 215 – 232.  
34 Digital Music Report 2012: Expanding Choice. Going Global. (2012)(available at 
http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2012.pdf)(describing the scope of global digital piracy including peer-to-
peer networks, blogs, cyberlockers, forums, websites, streaming sites, smartphone-based applications and stream 
ripping applications and estimating that “one in four… of internet users access unauthorized services on a monthly 
basis”) 16.  
35 Gilman (2011) at 2-3.  
36 Gilman (2011) at 5. 
37 Gilman (2011) at 5.  
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...[P]articipating in deviant globalization is often an individual’s fastest ticket out of poverty and 
a way for an entire community to experience economic development.”38 
The potential positive economic and developmental effects of deviant globalization do not exist 
in a vacuum. For every instance of an individual surviving by virtue of hard work and creative 
efforts in the informal market of deviant globalization, there are also those who are in virtual 
slavery to the organizations that control counterfeit distribution markets in which street 
vendors earn a subsistence wage, at best. In a five year observation of the pirate market in 
Florence, Italy, I have discovered that, while deviant globalization may provide economic 
benefits to some, it also presents serious human rights challenges when pirate markets are tied 
to immigration issues. Additional risks posed by the informal economy include: 1) the lack of a 
formal social security network with the result that inability to work due to health or other 
reasons translates into even greater poverty; 2) abuses of the workers at the lowest rung who are 
part of a process that includes undeniable human rights abuses;39 3) a strong undercurrent of 
violence in connection with certain organizational structures;40 and 4) enhanced financial 
support for organized crime and paramilitary operations since the ultimate purposes of the 
monies raised through this alternative economy  can include funding of such operations.41 Yet 
focusing solely on the “abusive” or “immoral” aspects of this “underground” economy ignores 
broad aspects of it whose illegality arises simply because it does not conform strictly to legal 
 
38 Gilman (2011) at 3-4. Gilman et al also acknowledge the “dark side” of deviant globalization on the poor, 
recognizing that it is also “a symbol of their exclusion and abjection” because deviant globalization not only often 
entails harrowing individual suffering, but it can also provide money and power to self-dealing government 
officials, brutal warlords and fanatical terrorists.” Gilman (2011) at 4. See also OECD, The Economic Impact of 
Counterfeiting and Piracy (2008). See generally Willem van Schendel & Itty Abraham, Illicit Flows and Criminal 
Things: States, Borders and the Other Side of Globalization (Indiana University Press 2005)(describing the distinctions 
between criminal syndicates and other illicit flows of goods and services globally).  
39These abuses do not only occur in cases of human organ or sex trafficking, but are also apparent in the treatment 
of street sellers of counterfeit goods, particularly where such distributors have other legal issues connected to their 
status, such as immigration status.  
40 See Naím (2005)(describing the violence that often accompanies smuggling and human trafficking enterprises); 
Tim Phillips, Knockoff: The Deadly Trade in Counterfeit Goods (Kogan Page 2007)(describing the use of violence to 
maintain counterfeit networks).  
41 See Ronald K. Noble, Testimony before the US House Committee on International Relations, ‘The Links 
Between Intellectual Property Crime and Terrorist Financing,’ 108th Congress (July 16, 2003)(describing a 
developing trend of paramilitary organizations to use intellectual piracy as a preferred form of fundraising); Doris 
Estelle Long, ‘Strategies for Securing the Cyber Safety Net Against Terrorists: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach’ 
(2009) in Terrorism and Global Insecurity: A Multidisciplinary Perspective (ed. Klint Alexander. Linton Atlantic Books, 
Ltd.)(exploring the burgeoning role that cyberspace plays in supporting funding activities to support diverse 
paramilitary and terrorists groups); Gregory F. Treverton, Carl Matthies, Karla J. Cunningham, Jeremiah Goulka, 
Greg Ridgeway, Anny Wong, Film Piracy, Organized Crime and Terrorism (RAND 2009)(describing the links between 
film piracy as a funding source for terrorist groups). But cf Joe Karaganis, ‘Rethinking Piracy’ (2011) in Media 
Piracy in Emerging Economies (Social Science Research Council)(identifying lack of price competition as the key 
factor in the rise of media piracy).  
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regulatory obligations, such as obtaining marketing permits or paying taxes.42 Such “illegality” is 
not the same as the “moral deviance” of engaging in sex, arms or even human organ trafficking 
that underlies Gilman et al’s analysis. Although some aspects of deviant globalization 
undeniably fit within these categories, the informal market, as a whole, is not necessarily 
criminal or even unsavory in nature.  
Consequently, I have used the term “deviant globalization” in this Article to refer to a broader 
underground (or informal) globalization. This globalization is “deviant,” not in the sense of 
moral deviancy, or criminality. Instead, it is “deviant” because this globalized market deviates in 
significant ways from the globalization that has been the focus of scholars, economists and 
popular writers for the past several decades.43 These “traditional globalization studies have 
largely focused on the impact of the regulated, lawful market.44 (The sole exception may be the 
treatment of the informal economy that has developed as part of the e-commerce explosion on 
the internet.) The term “deviant globalization” not only acknowledges that an unregulated, 
informal, underground, black market has existed for as long as the regulated one,45 it 
acknowledges that this “alternative” market, in all its hard goods and digital forms, is worthy of 
serious study. More to the point, the term “deviant globalization” acknowledges that these non-
traditional, under-regulated markets provide normative values that can be used to shape the 
outcome of a wide-range of present debates over intellectual property rights in the 21st Century 
in ways that harness the “creative destructive” power of deviant globalization to create more 
socially just regimes. These regimes assure balanced protection for intellectual property owners 
and those who seek access to the goods and services protected by such rights by placing the 
norms of the underground economy at the heart of the regime.  
“Deviant globalization” in the intellectual property arena, as I define it, serves both a predictive 
and a normative function. It serves a predictive function because it incorporates the 
 
42 See Van Schendel (2005) at 4 (“Many transnational movements of people, commodities and ideas are illegal 
because they defy the norms and rules of formal political authority, but they are quite acceptable, “licit,” in the eyes 
of participants in these transactions and flows.”).  
43 See also Ryan Matthews & Watts Wacker, The Deviant’s Advantage: How Fringe Ideas Create Mass Markets (Crown 
Business 2002) at xvi (“By definition, everything that is different is deviant. Of course there is a positive and 
negative deviance – the former a force for transformation the latter a source of unspeakable evil.”). 
44 Although there are innumerable studies by economists and others of the impact of globalization, among the 
most noteworthy works in the area, all of which focused on the regulated marketplace are David Held, Anthony 
McGrew, David Goldblatt & Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd. 2000); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (WW Norton 2002); A.G. Hopkins, 
Globalization in World History (W.W.Norton and Company 2002). Even historians of global trade focused primarily 
on regulated cross-border trade through the ages. See Kenneth Pomeranz & Steven Topik, The World that Trade 
Created: Society, Culture and the World Economy. 1400 to the Present (2nd ed. M.E. Sharpe 2006).  
45 In fact, there is some indication that in recent years this underground, informal economy may actually have 
grown larger than the traditional global marketplace. Robert Neuwirth, Stealth of Nations: The Rise of the Informal 
Economy (Pantheon Books 2011) at 18 – 19, 26 – 28; Naím (2005) at 4-5. Some economists have claimed that the 
informal economy actually pre-dates the regulated formal economy we associate with globalization. See Neuwirth 
(2011) at 24.  
  
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
Issue 2012#2 
9 
experimental standards we are already witnessing in domestic and international effort to re-
invent intellectual property standards for the 21st Century. It serves a normative function 
because it creates a new normative standard that incorporates social and economic norms from 
the informal market into formal normative values against which decisions regarding intellectual 
property standards can be evaluated and revised.  
2.1 A Brief Primer on Deviant Globalization  
Similar to the traditional hard goods market, no single instance of deviant globalization 
operates in precisely the same way; but every informal market shares certain characteristics that 
make deviant globalization a valuable source for intellectual property norms. From the markets 
operated by the inhabitants of the favelas of Brazil, to the garbage pickers of Lagos; from the 
sellers of counterfeit purses in Italy, to the bazaars of the Middle East, these informal markets 
fulfill consumer needs unmet by the regulated marketplace. Although some of these needs may 
well be for illicit goods and services, others are filled by goods the government is unable or 
unwilling to provide. Thus, for example, in the underground market described by Neuwirth in 
Stealth of Nations46 are the individuals who sell legitimate products at discounted wholesale 
prices in the early morning markets, street vendors of legitimate, but cheaply priced, tourist 
souvenirs, and those who provide food and beverages to such vendors out of the back of trucks 
and food carts. All of these vendors share common traits of selling goods below the prices of 
traditional brick and mortar sellers because they do not have to maintain permanent housings 
or pay taxes on their business earnings. Some of these sellers earn significant incomes that allow 
them to expand their businesses. All of them are earning monies that would not be available 
through the regulated market.47 Similarly, garbage pickers in various countries locate recyclable 
materials and create an unregulated supply network for these goods that not only has potential 
environmental benefits,48 but also provide income to those at the lowest economic rungs of 
society.  
 
46 Neuwirth (2011) at 1-16. See also OECD, Competition Policy and the Informal Economy (2009)(describing various 
ways in which the informal economy interacts with the formal economy, including as an alternative outlet for 
product of the formal sector). 
47 Neuwirth (2011)(describing diverse markets where the participants in the informal economy earn monies 
otherwise unavailable to them); Naím (2005) ) at 109-130 (describing the incomes earned through trade in 
counterfeit and pirated goods). But see OECD (2009) at 33- 35 (contending that despite its size in developing 
countries the informal economy harms competition because informal firms are less productive and unable to 
achieve economies of scale).  
48 The environmental benefits secured by these untapped avenues for recycling and other forms of green 
technology must, of course, be contrasted with environmentally dangerous informal markets in toxic waste exports 
and computer waste. See Jennifer Clapp, ‘Toxic Exports: Despite Global Treaty, Hazardous Waste Trade 
Continues’ (2011) in Gilman (2011); Naím (2005) at 167 – 169.  
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These unregulated efforts highlight a critical element of deviant globalization – its innovative 
nature. Such innovation is amply demonstrated by the development of new technological 
models for distributing content on the informal markets of the internet. From the early file 
trading software of Napster, to websites such as ThePirateBay that provide global digital access 
to streaming content, the unregulated economy of the internet has been a hallmark of 
distributive innovation. Distributive innovation, however, is not limited to the technologically 
proficient. To the contrary, deviant globalization encourages innovation at all levels of the 
socio-economic strata. Among the oil workers in Lagos, Nigeria, for example, there was an 
unfulfilled need for inexpensive, but safe, drinking water. Individuals began selling water in 
plastic bags to meet this need. This new business has proven so successful some sellers have 
even developed names and symbols to mark their water as reliable.49  
2.2 The “Norms” of Deviant Globalization  
With its emphasis on trade and innovation across socio-economic levels and its focus on unmet 
consumer demands, deviant globalization based models would bring new understandings of the 
relationship between compensation, access, and distributional innovation in present 
intellectual property debates. These new understandings would bring social norming principles 
in a more direct manner into the creation of formally recognized intellectual property norms. 50 
Although every informal market is different, there are four over-arching operational principles 
of deviant globalization that are most useful in recalibrating present intellectual property 
norms. They are:  
1.  fair compensation fuels the market;  
2. consumers matter;  
3. innovative business models deserve adequate breathing space to flourish; and  
4. markets necessarily require regulation.  
As discussed more fully below, each of these has potentially wide application in the creation of 
new experimental models for intellectual property rights protection during this present 
dís·integratory phase of multilateral standard-making.  
 
49 Neuwirth (2011) at 42-43. 
50 See Steven A. Hetcher, Norms in a Wired World (Cambridge University Press 2007)(analyzing the various roles of 
norms, including social norms, in setting conduct rule on the internet); Ned Snow, ‘Copytraps’ (2009) 84 Indiana 
L.J. 285 (advocating for revisions to US copyright law that more accurately reflect the social norms of end users).  
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2.3 Fair Compensation Fuels the Market 
Fair compensation is the bedrock goal of a functioning informal market. The foundational 
principle of deviant globalization is filling market demand through fair prices for desired goods 
and services. The underground market is uniquely sensitive to competitive demands. Yet at the 
heart of the informal economy is compensation – or more specifically the financial and other 
rewards available for providing desired goods and services. Any effort to redefine distributional 
rights for intellectual property, including terms of access and use, must begin by addressing the 
question of compensation – who, when, where and for what activities. Placing compensation at 
the center of normative considerations does not obligate that all uses of intellectual property 
require monetary rewards. But it does require a principled examination of the impact of any 
exceptions or limitations on such rewards, as well as the adverse impact on the market if more 
than monetary compensation is required.  
If the goal of deviant globalization is to fill market demand, than eliminating the availability of 
a demanded product is less desirable than assuring reasonable compensation to the IP owner, 
so long as that product is not potentially harmful to the public. The norms derived from 
deviant globalization suggest that present compensation boundaries must be recalibrated to 
support a fair return for the use of intellectual property based goods and services. Such fairness 
may well require an alteration in methods for licensing intellectual property rights globally, 
including reconsideration of exhaustion and remedial relief.  
The most obvious applications of the fair compensation principle arises in the context of 
intellectual property licensing, including compulsory licenses on reasonable terms. Yet the 
compensation principle actually alters the shape of the debate over access rights. By placing the 
initial focus on fair compensation, deviant globalization changes the issue from one about 
compensated access to one about the nature of a rational compensation system. Thus, for 
example, debates over P2P file trading or methods for dealing with so-called “rogue websites” 
such as The Pirate Bay, change from demands for greater enforcement51 to new methods that 
follow the money trail to rebalance the economic harms of piracy.52 The elimination of 
consumer access to websites is replaced as the focus of enforcement efforts.53 Instead, as 
discussed in greater detail below, advertisers and website operators who earn money from the 
illegal activity become the focus, with monetary relief for the copyright owner as the basis for 
remediation.  
 
51 See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement; Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112 th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(October 26, 2011.  
52 See Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act (OPEN Act), H.R. 3782, 112 th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(January 18, 2012).  
53 See 17 USC § 512(c) (providing for removal of end user access to internet service providers as a remedy for 
unauthorized posting of copyrighted content).  
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Alternatively, future deviant globalization models may well create new licensing models to deal 
with the problems of P2P file trading or the use of trademarks as keyword buys.54 Although 
initial attempts to treat P2P file trading as a form of communication to the public for which 
license fees were owed initially failed in the United States,55 new models may be less restrictive 
in their efforts to rebalance access with compensation. Radio stations and other broadcast 
entities currently pay composers and performers for their broadcast/public performance of 
copyrighted music.56 Similar payment obligations could readily be imposed for websites earning 
money from hosting copyrighted content.  
More radically, fair use and compulsory licensing systems may be imposed to allow broader uses 
of trademarks for non-source designating purposes -- the “information asset” nature of a mark.57 
Briefly, the term “information asset” refers to the “informational values” of a mark unrelated to 
consumer product information (the traditional search-designating function of trademarks most 
closely associated with the concept of “goodwill.”).58 Such informational value may develop 
from the same types of investments and uses that give rise to the source-designating function 
protected under traditional trademark-rights analysis. But the information content that is 
valued is not directly related to individual purchaser decision making. To the contrary, similar 
to copyrighted works, these information-asset marks have value due to their expressive or 
emotive content.59 Because this informational value of a mark is the creature of investment, 
 
54 See Google AdWords at https://adwords.google.com.  Any such licensing scheme would necessarily have to 
overcome potential limitations including the general prohibition against the compulsory licensing of marks.  Doris 
Estelle Long, ‘Rebooting Trademarks for the 21st Century’ (2011) 49 U. Louisville L. Rev. 517 (suggesting that 
such limitations might be dealt with by recognizing a new type of trademark – the information asset mark – which 
lacks a source designation function).  
55 See United States Of America v. American Society Of Composers, Authors And Publishers (ASCAP), 627 F.3d 64 ( 2nd 
Cir. 2010). 
56 See generally WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Art. 11 ; Beijing Audio Visual Performances Treaty, 
Art. 15.  
57 Long (2011) at 523.  
58 Long (2011) at 541- 543. 552- 553.  
59 Long (2011) at 541 – 542. 
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third party uses of such “information assets” may warrant compensation.60 They may also be 
subject to compulsory licenses or even fair use/fair dealing style exceptions.61  
Conceivably the most direct impact the adoption of deviant globalization models may have is 
on the issue of remedial rights for intellectual property violations. Injunctive relief that prevents 
access is already being replaced by judicially mandated compulsory licenses in certain 
situations.62 Denials of injunctive relief are becoming increasingly prevalent where there is 
evidence of consumer harm if the injunction issues.63 Such denials should increase under new 
deviant globalization models.  
Considering the issue of fair prices and fair trade, deviant globalization models may create a 
one-item-one-payment system that supports international exhaustion for certain intellectual 
property based goods. Limitations on such exhaustion would be premised primarily on the 
harm to the consumer. Thus, copyrighted goods would generally be subject to exhaustion. By 
contrast, trademarked goods might be excluded from such exhaustion, at least in instances 
where the same mark represents different consumer meanings or different goodwill.64 
Deviant globalization will provide critical guidance on the question of intellectual property and 
“fair trade,” particularly in connection with the issue of access to medicines and critical 
technologies at reasonable prices. The recent decision by the Controller of India's Patent Office 
in granting Natco Pharma Ltd. a compulsory license to sell SORAFENIB, the generic version of 
the German-based Bayer AG's (Bayer) patented kidney and lung cancer drug NEXAVAR, 
 
60 Long (2011) at 550. 
61Since the closest analogue to the information-asset mark is a digital copyrighted work, digital licensing models for 
such works, including for example, the present Sound Exchange performing rights and Creative Commons 
licensing schemes, could serve as beneficial models. Sound Exchange is a performing rights organization that 
collects and distributes digital performance rights royalties in the United States. Creative Commons is a nonprofit 
organization that offers several types of model licenses to permit the uncompensated licensing of copyrighted 
materials. Long (2011) at 548-552. See generally About the Licenses, Creative Commons, 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses; Katie Pimentel, “Trademark Use as Keywords: A Comparative Look at Trademark 
Use as Keywords in Paid Search and Digital Public Performance Rights for Sound Recordings’ (2010) 9 J. Marshall Rev. 
Intell. Prop. L. 553, 573 (suggesting a compensation model under which keyword buys are compensated similar to 
digital copyrights).  
62 Ebay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 US 388 (2006).  Although many countries do not presently allow judges to 
deviate from statutory remedies, as such remedial actions are modified in the face of deviant globalization norms, 
judges would be given the right to deny injunctive relief in certain cases where such denial serves distributional 
innovation goals.   
63Ebay, 547 US 388. Cf. Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), Case C-
70/10 [2012] E.C.D.R. 4 (ECJ (3rd Chamber))(injunction denied in connection with unauthorized peer-to-peer file 
trading).  
64 Because of the unique nature of patents, that only exist in the event of a domestic grant, international 
exhaustion is arguably less applicable. But cf 35 US §§271(f)(imposing liability for the supply of “any component 
of a patented invention” combined outside the United States “in a manner that would infringe the patent if such 
combination occurred within the United States) & 271(g)(imposing liability for the importation of a product 
“made by a process patented in the United States”).  
  
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
Issue 2012#2 
14 
reflects the increasing concern about the cost of patent protected medicines.65 In support of his 
decision to grant a compulsory license to a local manufacturer, the Controller cited the high 
prices Bayer charged for the drug, (US$5,600 per month as opposed to Natco’s claimed $177 
per month), the small amounts of the product Bayer had imported to meet domestic needs, and 
Bayer’s failure to manufacture the drug in India. Under Indian law, a compulsory license can be 
granted if the patent owner fails to make the drug available “on reasonable terms.”66 According 
to the Controller, these terms are not met “[i]f the drug is so highly priced that the ordinary 
public cannot afford it.”67 In establishing lack of affordability, the Controller relied on the 
limited amount of the drug Bayer sold in light of anticipated need: “It stands to common logic 
that a patented article … was not bought by the public due to only one reason, i.e., its price was 
not reasonably affordable to them.”68 Ultimately, the Controller granted Natco a non-exclusive 
license to manufacture and sell the drug in India for $177 per month in exchange for a 6% 
royalty. What is most notable about this decision is the Controller’s grudging recognition that 
the fairness of the price charged was not solely a matter of price comparison between the 
generic manufacturer and the patent holder who had incurred substantial research and 
development costs. Although the Controller held that a “reasonably affordable price has to be 
construed predominantly with reference to the public,”69 the term “predominant” is significant. It 
represents a partial acceptance of Bayer’s argument that reasonableness must be judged at least 
in part with consideration of an inventor’s right to recoup its investment. Ultimately, the 
royalty the Controller established reflected this recoupment principle.70 Considerations of 
consumers needs, balanced with consideration of the inventor’s need to recover costs of 
innovation and testing, which second comers never incur, reflects the beginning stages of a 
deviant globalization model. By combining the foundational principles of reasonable 
compensation for intellectual property owners with fair trade norms this case presages the 
benefits and future paths deviant globalization provides in configuring a rational balance 
between compensation and access. In determining the reasonableness of a particular price or 
royalty rate, however, given the increasing emphasis on global trade, determinations of the 
adequacy of the return on investment under deviant globalization principles will most likely 
consider the global sales history for the product. This expanded treatment of global sales data 
 
65 In the Matter of Natco Pharma Ltd and Bayer Corporation, Application for Compulsory License Under Section 84(1) 
of the Patents Act, 1970, in Respect of Patent No. 215758 (Controller of Patents, Mumbai)(March 9, 2012).  
66 Natco, India at 15. 
67 Natco, India at 16. 
68 Natco, India at 36.  
69 Natco, India at 36 
70 Natco, India at 59. Section 90 of the relevant Indian law required the Controller to consider “the expenditure 
incurred by the patentee in making the invention, the expenditure incurred by the patentee in making the 
invention or in developing it and obtaining a patent and keeping it in force” as well as “other relevant factors.” 
Section 90(1) of the Indian Patents Amendment Act of 2002. Lack of evidence from Bayer regarding actual 
development costs prevented the Controller from reaching a more accurate determination of the amount of 
recoupment required.  
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underscores the significance differential pricing should play in future compensation 
determinations under future deviant globalization models.71 
2.4 Consumers Matter.  
For markets to flourish, consumers must have trust in the goods they buy. No one knowingly 
buys a counterfeit drug with the expectation that it will not work. Goods and services which 
physically harm people are not part of an effectively working marketplace. While you can buy 
novelty items as part of the informal market that break after a few uses,72 sellers of day-to-day 
items generally do not sell defective goods if they are seeking repeat business. Thus, the woman 
who sells food to the workers in the informal market in Sao Paolo does not knowingly sell them 
contaminated food. Similarly, sellers of pirated videos in the indoor markets of Lima, do not 
sell defective DVDs.73 Because consumers need to be protected, enforcement of intellectual 
property rights under deviant globalization models will increasingly be tiered to focus initially 
on methods for dealing effectively with the unauthorized manufacture and distribution of 
physically harmful goods, then on economically harmful ones.  
For developing countries, limited budgets necessarily give rise to variable enforcement 
modalities. This present reality under deviant globalization models will be acknowledged as a 
permissible (legal) choice. Issues of “effective enforcement” under TRIPS74 and other 
multinational instruments,75 will place consumer health and safety issues as a baseline against 
which the effectiveness of enforcement efforts may be judged. Countries that focus primarily on 
the eradication of physically harmful goods in the initial stages of enforcement capacity 
building will not be distracted by potential threats of WTO sanctions for ineffective 
enforcement activities. For developing and least developed countries with limited enforcement 
budgets, deviant globalization supports public enforcement efforts, including enhanced 
 
71 Such differential pricing models will need to be supported by recalibrations of obligations by customs and other 
authorities for controlling the diversion of such differentially-priced goods away from the consumers in the 
countries for which they were distributed.  
72 Tourist goods are notoriously unreliable given the transitory nature of the consuming public. I have witnessed 
countless sales of outdated, damaged or used goods to unwitting tourists. For example, in Venice, Italy, I watched 
tourists pay full price for fake rubberized tomatoes that splat into squishy blobs when thrown on the pavement. 
Tourists would buy tomatoes which failed to splat after two or three throws because the seller has used them as the 
“demonstration” version he’d been using to secure sales. Of course, by the time the buyer discovered the shoddy 
workmanship, the vendor had already moved on.  
73 By contrast, based on my personal experiences, the quality of other items sold in the market, which fell outside 
local DVD labeling requirements, including non-prescription medicine, were more questionable.  
74 TRIPS, Art. 41 (imposing an obligation on Member countries to provide “effective enforcement” of intellectual 
property rights).  
75 See ACTA, Art. 6.1 (requiring “enforcement procedures … to permit effective action against any act of 
infringement of intellectual property rights”). Cf. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art. 11 (requiring “effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures”). 
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penalties, that are first directed to removing potentially harmful goods from the marketplace. 
Under deviant globalization models, such “harm” will first be defined as those goods which 
present potential threats to public health and safety. Thus, counterfeit medicines, ingestible 
goods, cosmetics, automobile parts and other products whose quality is critical to public health 
and safety should be the subject of strong sanctions. Furthermore, to adequately protect the 
public, these sanctions should not be applied solely on proof of actual harm. Instead, they 
should be applied to remove the potential for such harm so that consumers can be assured that 
only safe goods are being offered in the market.  
The removal of harmful goods from local markets, however, will form only one portion of more 
directed means to stop the flow of counterfeit goods across borders. New modalities for 
regulating such flows will emerge. Customs standards may be revised to permit the seizure of 
harmful counterfeit goods in transit.76 When dealing with the issue of pirate websites, 
distinctions may initially be made based on the types of goods offered by the websites. Music 
and copyrighted works might be subject to monetary compensation while purveyors of 
potentially harmful goods, such as counterfeit drugs, would be subject to removal and 
coordinated efforts to prevent their re-appearance. This could include an array of 
methodologies such as access blocking by ISPs and/or better monitoring of the accuracy of 
domain name registrant identities for commercial websites to support stricter prohibitions 
against re-registration of prohibited websites. These prohibitions will be enforced by alternatives 
to present notice and take down provisions.77 Such alternatives, however, will not be limited to 
notice and notice options,78 but will undoubtedly include diverse streamlined 
administrative/court processes that ensure that only sites that provide counterfeit goods are 
removed. 79  
As countries move farther along the development curve, “harm” from counterfeit goods will be 
defined as including the “economic harms” posed by counterfeiting. These harms would 
 
76 Presently TRIPS does not require in-transit enforcement measures. Even ACTA only treats in-transit 
enforcement as an optional choice. ACTA, Art. 16(2)(“A Party may adopt or maintain procedures with respect to 
suspect in-transit goods…”)(emphasis added).  
77 See 17 USC § 512(c)(establishing procedures for ISP takedowns of infringing materials on notice from copyright 
owners); Canadian Modernization Act, C-11 §41.25 (establishing procedures for notice to ISPs of infringing 
materials with subsequent notice to end users).  
78 See Canadian Copyright Modernization Act, C-11, §§41.25 – 4.126 (describing notice and notice procedures for 
removal by ISPs of allegedly infringing third party content; compliance is unrelated to safe harbor status).  
79 These stricter provisions will most likely include stronger evidentiary proofs of counterfeit activity. See London-
Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1 et al, 542 F. Supp.2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008)(court requires “concrete showing of a prima 
facie claim of actionable harm; specificity of the discovery request; the absence of alternative means to obtain the 
requested identity disclosure; a “central need” for the information; and no undue harm to end user’s expectations 
of privacy); Bonnier Audio AB v. Perfect Communication Sweden AB, Case No. C-461/10, [2012] ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 
452 (ECJ (Third Chamber)(upholding national law that required “clear evidence that someone has committed an 
infringement” for disclosure of identity of allegedly infringing party and that further limited disclosure “only if the 
reasons for the measure outweigh the nuisance or other harm which the measure entails for the person affected by 
it or for some other conflicting interest)(Swedish copyright law).  
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include adversely affecting the ability to grow local industries that support the manufacturing 
and distribution of legitimate products. As “glocalization” becomes more significant, early focus 
on economic harm may be directed to those industries that have a purely local presence, or to 
goods which fill uniquely local needs. Subsequent development, however, should also include 
protection against economic harm for all brands, and not merely local ones.  
This re-emphasis on protecting consumers will also support a re-examination and re-emergence 
of the parallel market. Sustainable development and technology transfer have long been 
recognized as critical linchpins to the growth of effective local markets.80 They have even been 
memorialized as part of the international intellectual property regime under TRIPS.81 Since the 
heart of the parallel market is the provision of goods and services at affordable prices to those 
under-served by traditional markets, the renewed focus on compensation rights described above 
will be combined with consumer protection concerns to redefine the limitations on the 
importation and distribution of grey market goods. For example, the importation of grey 
market medicines might be allowed to combat a local pandemic, so long as the efficacy of such 
drugs is unquestioned.82  
As we obtain more experience in striking realistic enforcement modalities, concerns over 
economic harm may be further refined by models that make more nuanced distinctions 
between socially beneficial uses and other deviant globalization norms. To provide fair access to 
consumers, courts may make more realistic appraisals of consumer need for low cost 
compulsory licenses in the face of countervailing IP owners’ rights. Thus, medicine to treat 
pandemics or even diseases, such as diabetes, that affect the quality of life, and/or its longevity, 
are more likely to be subject to defendable compulsory licenses than those that treat male 
pattern baldness. Similarly, compulsory licenses for operating software or smart phone 
 
80 See TRIPS, Art. 7 (providing that protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights “should contribute 
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology…”); UN System 
Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, Science, technology and innovation and intellectual property 
rights: The vision for development (May 2012)(advocating for creation of improved platforms through which scientific 
and other developmental knowledge can be shared).  
81 See TRIPS, Art. 7 (“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations.”) & Art. 66(2)(“Developed country Members shall provide incentives to 
enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to 
least developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.”)(emphasis 
added in both).  
82 See TRIPS, Art. 31bis (providing for compulsory licenses for importation of patented drugs to meet domestic 
needs); William W. Fisher III & Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The South Africa AIDS Controversy: a Case Study in Patent 
Law and Policy (2005)(available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf)(case study of 
AIDS pandemic in South Africa and dispute over importation of grey market generics). In order to meet the meet 
the efficacy concerns of consumers, definitions of acceptable grey market pharmaceuticals may need to be refined 
to assure that the sources for such goods are legitimate ones. Thus, the importation and sale of legitimate generic 
drugs should be permissible while counterfeit goods (which are not subject to quality control) would remain 
excludable.  
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technology may be more readily defensible than those that allow the continuing provision of 
illegal music, films or videogames.  
2.5 Innovative Business Models Deserve Adequate Breathing Space to Flourish.  
One of the strengths of deviant globalization is that it allows people at the lowest economic 
rung of economic development to earn a living through innovative actions. In deviant 
globalization, “innovation” includes entrepreneurial innovation such as that recognized in the 
Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation of the U.N. Millennium Project.83 The 
complex interplay of factors that leads to successful innovation is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Yet what appears abundantly clear is that successful entrepreneurial innovation 
necessarily includes distributional processes and techniques as well as new goods and services. 
More effective support for distributional innovation under deviant globalization models does 
not require that needs of intellectual property owners be ignored or given short shrift. But it 
does require that their interests be re-balanced with those of sellers and consumers. Thus 
present “free access” demands for the sake of encouraging innovation or creativity84 have less 
importance than the economic significance of permitting alternative avenues of distribution.  
So-called “rogue sites” that offer either unauthorized downloadable or streaming, unedited 
copyrighted content, are located at the point of greatest intersection between deviant and 
traditional globalization. The fair trade norms of deviant globalization offer the most likely 
sources for rational solutions to this knotty problem. There is no question that rogue sites that 
provide copyrighted content in a digital format represent a distributional innovation. This 
distributional innovation is arguably supported by deviant globalization norms because it 
provides goods consumers demand, in a form and with use limitations that meet their 
reasonable needs. At the same time, compensation flow considerations require that copyright 
owners receive some compensation for the communication to the public of their content.  
 
83. UN Millennium Project, Task Force on Sci., Tech., and Innovation, Innovation: Applying Knowledge in 
Development (2005) (prepared by Calestous Juma & Lee Yee-Cheong), available at 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/Science-complete.pdf. This report emphasized the 
entrepreneurial foundations of innovation and its critical role in helping transform countries from reliance on the 
exploitation of natural resources to technological innovation as a basis for development. 
84 These demands include heightened fair use rights for the display of user generated content derived from the 
unauthorized use of third party works. As noted above the resolution to such challenges using deviant globalization 
norms to create intellectual property standards would not necessarily establish predictable exceptions under fair 
use/fair dealing doctrines. Instead, such issues might well be resolved by revised compulsory licensing regimes that 
treat posting as equivalent to broadcasting, requiring compensation to the copyright owner by the website 
operator, not the end user.  
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Present efforts that focus on going after the compensation earned by rogue website owners and 
third parties who provide advertising and sales support for such compensation streams85 
represent a deviant globalization based solution. The innovative approach of these websites 
gives consumers access to digital content that would otherwise be unavailable. Such distributive 
innovations, similar to peer-to-peer (P2P) file trading software, may be worth encouraging. The 
monies earned from such innovations, however, should form a source of compensation for the 
copyright owners whose content fuels the popularity of these unauthorized distribution sources. 
Compensation streams can also form a potent source for eliminating rogue sites that are merely 
freeloaders as opposed to valuable, if low-cost, economic actors. Alternatively, they can also be 
used to eliminate pirate sites whose social benefit is outweighed by the economic harms caused 
to content owners and related local industries, including authorized distributors. By focusing 
on compensation streams, deviant globalization puts the economic viability of piracy into play, 
not its moral necessity.  
As economics comes more clearly into focus, deviant globalization analysis will lead to greater 
differentiations in treatment between websites providing access to useful technologies, as 
opposed to those which merely meet consumer desires for inexpensive luxury or non-essential 
goods. While consumers may desire free, unlimited access to movies and music, these demands 
for access raise distinctly different economic and social justification issues than demands for 
similar access to computer operating software. While the first may be dealt with through 
outright prohibition or compensation streams to IP owners from the money trail; the second 
may trigger a greater reliance on compulsory license and differential pricing supports to meet 
fair trade needs of consumers, and investment returns for innovators.  
I would also expect more useful licensing models for both content owners and providers of 
intellectual property based goods and services to develop in the next decade of deviant 
globalization. Creative Commons86 has undeniably expanded the licensing modalities for 
copyrighted works to allow authors to permit unlimited uses of their works. As authors become 
more familiar with the benefits and perils of blogs, content branding and other distributive 
innovations, they, however, are revising the types of licenses they need. Present popular 
licensing models have evolved from unlimited uses to limited reproduction rights, supported by 
full original source accreditation. Such distributive licensing innovations should continue in all 
areas of open source and open access modalities.  
Micropayments, limited field, limited country, copy forward and other technological supported 
limitations and methodologies will continue to develop to rationalize compensation streams 
and access rights under deviant globalization models. New compensation flows to support 
 
85 See Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act (OPEN Act), H.R. 3782, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(January 18, 2012)(establishing potential liability of advertising agencies, credit card companies, and others who 
earn money as a direct result of the provision of pirated copyright content; this technique has been referred to as 
“following the money trail”).  
86 See Creative Commons website at www.creativecommons.org.  
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creative uses of copyrighted works to produce goods and services that form part of an 
economically viable new market will be developed that reflect the economic focus of deviant 
globalization. For example, utilization of Western movies to create a local movie industry, such 
as in Nigeria,87 creates new product for underserved markets. Some form of compensation may 
be required for such derivative works,88 but local experimentation should develop more rational 
economic models. These models will not only reflect different compensation methodologies – 
including micropayments and post production royalty streams89 – but will also differentiate 
between substantial uses with minimal transformational aspects on one hand, which would 
arguably require compensation,90 and insubstantial uses (such as minimal sampling) and 
transformational new works that require no such compensation.91 These innovative licensing 
models will be matched by expanded exceptions that give new business models room to develop 
before intellectual property owners close them down.92 It will also require new considerations of 
the territorial boundaries of present collective rights licensing models. Experimentation in this 
area is already underway.93 It should gain greater momentum as the treatment of orphan works, 
new models for such licensing webhosting facilities that serve as the present equivalent of 
 
87 See Olufunmilayo Arewa, ‘The Rise of Nollywood: Creators, Entrpreneurs and Pirates’ (2012) UCLA Irvine 
Legal Research Paper Series No. 2012-11 (examining the role of piracy in the creation of the Nigerian film industry 
and in its distribution networks).  
88 For example, adapting a novel into a screenplay may require compensation. By contrast, creating parodies or 
other original (non-superseding) derivative works may not require such compensation under deviant globalization 
norms. See Doris Estelle Long, ‘Dissonant Harmonization: Limitations on Cash ‘n Carry Creativity’ (2007) 70 
Albany L. Rev.1163 (advocating a more nuanced approach to the right of copyright owners’ ability to control 
adaptive uses of their works).  
89 Such post-production royalty streams support local development by sharing investment risks with intellectual 
property owners. Under this model, only successful works would give rise to a compensation obligation.  
90 Such minimal transformational uses are at variance with the fair use principles recognized under Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), and its progeny and are closer to the virtual copying that is the keystone 
of pirated material on the internet.  
91 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)(fair use applies where work is transformative and does 
not supersede the original). US courts are inconsistent in their treatment of sampling. While the court in Bridgeport 
Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005), found arguably minimal sampling of four notes 
qualified as infringing, other courts have recognized that sampling may qualify as non-infringing if the amount is 
quantitatively or qualitatively insignificant. See Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir 2003)(sampling of 3-note 
sequence qualified as de minimis infringement).  
92 An interesting foreshadowing of this treatment occurred in a case in the United States involving a claimed fair 
use defense of infringing conduct based on unauthorized P2P file trading. In Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. 
Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp.2d 217, 236 (D. Mass. 2009), the court specifically recognized that copyright infringement 
based on new business models might qualify for a fair use defense until the issues surrounding such new uses have 
been clarified: “The Court can also envision a fair use defense for a defendant who shared files during a period 
before the law concerning file sharing was clear and paid outlets were readily available. …A defendant who shared 
files online during this interregnum, sampling the new technology and its possibilities, but later shifted to paid 
outlets once the law became clear and authorized sources available, would present a strong case for fair use.”  
93 See Phil Hardy, Online Music Licensing – A Way Out of the Maze, WIPO Magazine (February 2011)(describing 
various approaches of European Union collective rights organizations to the challenge of digital cross border music 
licensing).  
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traditional broadcasting facilities and workable models for global collective licensing rights are 
created.  
2.6 Markets Necessarily Require Regulation.  
Even in the “wild frontier” of deviant globalization, rules exist. They may be unspoken; but they 
are based on the need to allocate space and supply lines in a transparent manner. Critically for 
intellectual property owners, these regulations often represent consensus-based concepts of 
economic and/or social fairness. Such consensus may become more difficult to achieve in the 
multi-forum era of dís·integration, but the norms that will be created using deviant 
globalization models should ultimately reflect a consensus based on the economic realities of 
the whole economy. 
In his discussion of the System D market in Sao Paolo in Stealth of Nations,94 Neuwirth describes 
a woman who cooks pastries at night, and arrives in the early morning hours to sell those 
pastries and hot coffee to the early traders in the underground wholesale market that occurs 
before the early morning street vendors arrive. She sells the goods out of the back of her truck, 
which is always parked in the same location. When Neuwirth asked her about the availability of 
the spot everyday she told him that she “holds it by custom and … will continue to operate 
there until she chooses to leave the business.”95 There are rules - even in the markets of deviant 
globalization. “Vendors pay no rent to occupy the curbside, and there’s no protection money, 
taxes, or other fees… ‘You simply ask, ‘Can I set up next to you?’ and if it’s okay, you do it.’ (If 
it’s no, and you set up anyway, you will surely have a fight.)” 96 Regulation is not the enemy of 
deviant globalization. Irrational regulation is. Under deviant globalization, such irrationality 
should be minimized by the guiding norms that place economic opportunity for all -- IP owners, 
developing economies and consumers—at the center of the analysis.  
Conclusion  
The emerging period of dís·integration provides an unparalleled opportunity for 
experimentation at the domestic and regional level – shorn of the strictures of multilateral 
institutionalism of the previous integratory period. Yet such experimentation is not without its 
perils. Just as the earlier period of integration was purportedly co-opted by the interests of 
 
94 Neuwirth (2011).  
95 Neuwirth (2011) at 15. 
96 Neuwirth (2011) at 14 – 15.  
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multinationals and other intellectual property holders,97 the present era may be co-opted by 
emerging powers of the anti-integration regime, including Google, concert promoters, 98 and 
others who have opposed any extension of intellectual property protection to the digital 
universe.99 Moreover, the experimentation that is the natural result of dís·integration will only 
be successful if such experimentations are created and shared in a transparent manner so that 
early efforts can be refined in the face of practical experiences. Eventually, a new institutional 
structure to promote such sharing should emerge. This structure should be designed to 
facilitate the creation and refinement of deviant globalization based solutions to a panoply of 
issues that can only be imagined in this Article.  
At its heart, deviant globalization – with its focus on the operational and economic norms of 
the informal economy – is about balancing the competing interests of intellectual property 
owners, consumers and the general public in an economically and socially just manner. Some 
experiments in crafting effective deviant globalization models will undoubtedly fail. Yet even 
such failures will be useful in recalibrating present international protection norms so that 
intellectual property protection can continue to provide the innovative foundation for a 
vibrant, socially just, global marketplace for the 21st Century.  
 
 
97See Michael Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and the Politics of Intellectual Property (Brookings 
Institute 1998); Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge 
University Press 2003). 
98 In an era where the music industry holds less sway, concert promoters have emerged as the new power. 
99 This includes the organizations that created the successful STOP SOPA campaigns in the United States and the 
STOP ACTA campaign in Europe. The ability to generate such widespread internet power in the face of largely 
rhetorical claims – that ACTA will “destroy the internet” – demonstrates the power that is at least equivalent to 
that ascribed to multinationals during globalization. 
